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VIOLENCE IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: IS IT
TIME FOR CRIMINAL PENALTIES?
By Richard B. Perelman *
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem is well-known among sports fans. Violence in pro-
fessional sporting events has reached almost epidemic proportions. Al-
most all daily newspapers report about hundreds of penalty minutes for
brawls in National Hockey League (NHL) games, fistfights in National
Basketball Association (NBA) contests and about injuries suffered in
National Football League (NFL) battles.' Recent commentary has ex-
amined new case law in the area2 and the possibility of civil suit to
redress damage.3 The criminal law confronted the problem in the form
of a bill introduced in 1980 in the House of Representatives by Rep.
Ronald M. Mottl.4 The bill would have penalized convicted offenders
* B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1978. J.D., Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles, 1981. Admitted to practice, December, 1981. Currently, Assistant Vice-President,
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee.
1. The scope of this note is limited to considerations of only three professional sports:
football, basketball and hockey. Problems of violence in baseball have been well considered
in other forums. See Hechter, The Criminal Law and Violence in Sports, 19 CRIM. L.Q. 425,
440-42 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Hechter); Note, Torts in Sports-Deterring Violence in Pro-
fessionalAthletics, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 764 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Torts in Sports); J.
WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 933-951 (1979) (hereinafter cited as LAW OF
SPORTS). See generally, Wulf, Up in Arms Over Beanballs, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 14,
1980, at 26.
2. See the lengthy bibliography in R. HORROW, SPORTS VIOLENCE: The interaction
between private law making and the criminal law 251-52, 259-63 (1980) (hereinafter cited as
HORROW); Torts in Sports, supra note 1.
3. See note 2 supra. See also Note, The Sports Court.- A Private System to Deter Vio-
lence in Professional Sports, 55 S. CALIF. L. REV. 399 (1982).
4. H.R. 7903, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reintroduced as H.R. 2263, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981). Mottl has the able help of Rick Harrow, who wrote the book cited supra note 2.
Horrow, formerly a Harvard law student, spent much of his time gathering the data for his
book, which was originally presented as a senior thesis. See 126 Cong. Rec. E3711-12 (daily
ed. July 31, 1980). Horrow is now an attorney in Miami. The bill has received some impor-
tant support, notably from The Sporting News, a leading sports newsweekly. See The
Sporting News, Aug. 23, 1980, at 14.
Motti, an Ohio Democrat, was not re-elected in 1982. NEWSPAPER ENTERPRISES ASSo-
CIATION, INC., THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 1983 47 (1982). Nevertheless, bills
concerning the topic discussed here will likely be introduced in the future; the problem has
not withered.
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with fines up to $5,000 and/or up to one year in jail.'
This note will analyze the nature of the problem dealt with by the
bill in the context of three major professional sports: football, basket-
ball and hockey. It will examine the current remedies provided by the
sports leagues themselves and the civil process, their inadequacy to
stem the excessively violent tide and the probable effectiveness of crim-
inal sanctions against knowing infliction of excessive physical force, as
outlined by the Mottl bill.
II. THE PROBLEM
A. The Role of Sport in the Society
Some values of sport are obvious to those who have played and
are at least appreciated by those who have not. For many who partici-
pate, sports are fun. It's a way to keep your weight down, by burning
calories through physical exertion. In general, sport improves one's
physical condition. For those who do not participate, but watch others
who do, it provides entertainment, sometimes as intense an experience
as that of those who participate.6 ,7
The overriding quality of sport, at least in prior times, seems to
have been the purity and goodness that was believed to be endemic to
sport itself. A "sportsman" has been defined as "a person who is fair
and generous and a good loser and a graceful winner."8 No definition
mentions brutality, viciousness or any of the other violent actions that
were the target of the Mottl bill.
B. Sport Today Is Marked by Frequent and Brutal Violence
There is little doubt that professional sport today is marked by an
overabundance of violence.' It has crippled some,'" and made "he-
5. Id.
6. Note some recent instances where fans have fought players who have come into the
stands after them! Los Angeles Times, Feb. 20, 1981, sec. 3, at 5; Los Angeles Times, Mar. 1,
1981, sec. 3, at 13.
7. J. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 24-26 (1976).
8. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 846 (7th ed. 1969).
9. Those involved with the legal profession can tell the issue is hot by the multiple
increase in articles in law reviews and other law-related publications. See the authorities
collected at notes 1-2, supra.
10. Darryl Stingley, formerly a wide receiver with the New England Patriots was para-
lyzed in a collision with Jack Tatum in a game against Oakland on August 12, 1978. See J.
TATUM & W. KUSHNER, THEY CALL ME ASSASSIN 170-71 (paperback ed. 1979) (hereinafter
cited as TATUM).
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roes" of others.'
Worst of all, the games themselves seem to be open invitations to
commit assault, battery, even mayhem. Jean Fugett, a professional
football player, has stated: "The game is legalized violence. . . . I can
go into a game and just literally try to break somebody's neck. . . . It
happens all the time."' 12 Jack Tatum's book title, "They Call Me
Assassin" indicates his reputation as a player. Tatum makes no secret
of his motivations during a game: "I never make a tackle just to bring
someone down. I want to punish the man I'm going after and I want
him to know that it's going to hurt every time he comes my way."' 3
The situation is the same in other sports, especially hockey. Don
Cherry, former coach of the Boston Bruins, once stated: "I wish I had
one man I could send after Mikita, to send him back to Czechoslovakia
in a coffin."' 4 The attitude of Philadelphia Flyers' coach Fred Shero is
typical: "Players die like flies in football, why is everyone up in arms
over violence in hockey?"' 5
While this inflammatory verbiage might be passed off as pure
braggadocio, the brutal reality of this attitude has seen light in too
many sporting events in the past few seasons.
In the 1980-81 season, for example, NHL crowds witnessed fights,
brawls and slugfests too numerous to list. Some particularly unfortu-
nate incidents stick out. On February 26, 1981, a game between the
Minnesota North Stars and the Boston Bruins was merely a sidelight to
the record-setting fight(s) on the ice.' 6 With seven separate brawls in
the first period alone, penalty minutes handed out totalled a record 406.
Twelve players were ejected. The first fight began seven seconds into
the game.
In April, 1981, the Los Angeles Kings and New York Rangers en-
gaged in an important playoff game. Gordon Edes' lead in the Los
Angeles Times read:
TV's version of "Masada" ended Wednesday night.
11. Tatum has achieved wide notoriety as a "vicious" hitter. He expounds on this at
length in his book, Id.
12. Hechter, supra note 1, at 437 n.63.
13. TATUM, supra note 10, at 12-13.
14. 126 Cong. Rec. E3712 (daily ed. July 31, 1980). Stan Mikita was one of the NHL's
great players, and played center for the Chicago Black Hawks.
15. Flakne & Caplan, Sports Violence and the Prosecution, TRIAL, Jan., 1977, at 33
(hereinafter cited as Flakne).
16. Los Angeles Times, Feb. 27, 1981, sec. 3, at 10. This news report states that 392
penalty minutes were charged. A later scorer's report apparently corrected earlier reports to
406. See Los Angeles Times, Mar. 17, 1981, sec. 3, at 4.
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The Kings and Rangers put on their own version Thurs-
day night at the Forum, staging a fight to the (almost) finish.
The slings and arrows of the Romans and Jews were re-
placed by high sticks, low blows and all-out brawling between
the Kings and Rangers. The debacle reached its nadir in a
bench-clearing fight at the end of the first period that nearly
spilled into the crowd.
"A total disgrace," said Kings' assistant coach Ralph
Backstrom.' 7
The game set a record for playoff penalties. 18 Yet the only penalty
against the participants to cover more than the time of the game itself
was a suspension of one player for one additional game.
An often-quoted portion of the Tatum book describes his hit on
Denver Broncos player Riley Odoms:
[Ilt was the best hit of my career. I heard Riley scream
on impact and felt his body go limp. He landed flat on his
back,. . . but Riley's eyes rolled back into his head and he
wasn't breathing. I had another knockout, and maybe this
time, I had even killed a man.'9
Basketball examples are more rare, but Los Angeles sports fans
remember well two incidents involving the Lakers. The best-known
"fight" was the one-punch mutilation of Rudy Tomjanovich's face by
Laker Kermit Washington. The jury awarded Tomjanovich $3.25 mil-
lion dollars, but the case was later settled.2 ° In the same year, Laker
center Kareem Abdul-Jabbar and Milwaukee Bucks center Kent Ben-
son exchanged blows that kept both out of subsequent games.
Remarkably, with public indignation over violent crime so high
that many feel it more important to fight violent crime than to re-tool
17. Los Angeles Times, Apr. 10, 1981, sec. 3, at 1.
18. Id. Records set included most penalty minutes assessed in a playoff game, 267 and
most penalties assessed, 43.
19. TATUM, supra note 10, at 18. This 1971 game was played at Denver. The Oakland
Raiders emerged the winner, 27-16.
20. The jury awarded $1.75 million incompensatory damages and $1.50 million in puni-
tive damages. Torts in Sports, supra note 1, at 765 n.9. The case was later settled for an
undisclosed amount. Los Angeles Times, Apr. 21, 1981, sec. 3, at 4. The settlement pre-
ceded oral argument on appeal by the defendant California Sports, Inc. (parent company of
the Lakers) by only seven days.
21. The incident occurred in the opening game of the 1977-78 season. Out of an 82-
game schedule that season, Abdul-Jabbar played only 62 and Benson played only 69. See
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION GUIDE for 1980-81 at 169-70 (M. Winick ed. 1980)
(hereinafter cited as NBA GUIDE).
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our national defense,22 there has been little done to stem the tide of
violence in professional sports. Mottl acknowledged that his bill was
apparently the first legislative effort on a national level.23
III. THE CURRENTLY AVAILABLE REMEDIES
A. Penalties Assessed During the Games Themselves
In each case of professional football, basketball and hockey, game
officials are able to penalize and/or eject individual players from that
particular game. In general, restrictions on player participation in that
particular game are all that game officials can impose. In special cir-
cumstances, penalties can be assessed that will suspend a player for one
additional game. These penalties, however, are severely restricted and
rarely invoked. The resulting deterrent effect of the playing rules is
almost non-existent. In fact, many teams flagrantly disregard such
rules by using "enforcers," players whose primary job is to provoke
physical conflict and intimidate the opposition.24 It is activities of these
players especially, that the Mottl bill would have affected.
1. Professional Football
Even the most casual fan is well aware of penalties that are
handed out during the course of play. In addition to technical viola-
tions of the rules, there are additional penalties for unnecessary rough-
ness, late hits, and the like. 5 These usually consist of penalty yardage.
22. Los Angeles Times, Mar. 28, 1981, sec. 1, at 3.
23. See Appendix A (Hearings on H.R. 7903 before the House Committee on the Judici-
ary's Subcommittee on Crime, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Rep. Ron-
ald M. Mottl)) (hereinafter cited as Mottl's Statement).
24. HORROW, supra note 2, at 20-24. Horrow notes that the sole purpose of some players
is to pay "policeman." Incredibly, player interviews seemed to indicate that such conduct by
these players is not perceived as being wrong in any way, despite the preference of these
players for violence over lawful team play. Id.
A graphic example of this mentality was provided in Rep. Mottl's remarks before the
House on July 31, 1980, when he read into the record a newspaper article that contained the
following passage:
It makes no difference in hockey. Former Bruins coach Don Cherry loves a
good fight, and once gave "enforcer" John Wensink a back-handed compliment for
scoring a few out-of-character goals. "I just hope he doesn't forget what got him
there," said Cherry. "I mean the goals are nice. I was happy that he got the hat
trick the other night, but not so happy as I've been when he's won some big fights
for us. I know I shouldn't say that, but that's the honest truth."
126 Cong. Rec. E3712 (daily ed. July 31, 1980).
To the same effect is the comment by hockey player Dave Schultz: "I'm more valuable
in the penalty box than I am sitting on the bench... I'm not gonna stop fighting even if I
could." HoRRow, supra note 2, at 23.
25. HORROW, supra note 2, at 72.
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The officials can also eject a player for various reasons. This is rarely
done, but a graphic example of the power of game officials occurred in
a game between the Atlanta Falcons and the Chicago Bears during the
1980-81 season. With Chicago leading Atlanta late in the third quarter,
a questionable call near the goal line induced Bear running-back Wal-
ter Payton to challenge the call. In the course of pleading his case, he
unintentionally touched an official. He did no harm; the touch was the
most innocuous possible. Yet, touching an official is grounds for ejec-
tion, and the official exercised this discretion and ejected Payton imme-
diately. It was the first time he had ever been ejected from a game.
The loss of Payton slowed the Bears' momentum and Atlanta, perhaps
because Payton could not play after that, won the game.26
2. Professional Basketball
Simply expressed, a personal foul is a foul which involves contact
with an opponent. Any player assessed with six such fouls during the
course of a single game is disqualified from further participation in that
game.28 Additionally, technical fouls may be assessed for non-contact
violations of the rules.29 Each technical foul is accompanied by a fine:
$100 for the first and $150 for the second.30 Ejection is a matter for
discretion of the game officials, by assessment of technical fouls. A
player may be ejected after one technical foul, or may be immediately
ejected after a fighting foul has been called.31 As in football, contact
with an official is grounds for ejection. Intentional contact with an offi-
cial requires automatic ejection and suspension and loss of pay for the
32next game.
26. With Chicago leading Atlanta 17-14 late in the third quarter, the Bears mounted a
drive to the Atlanta five-yard line. Payton scrambled for a four-yard gain to the one, but
was charged with a fumble that films showed later to have been an erroneous call. Atlanta
recovered the fumble with 3:51 to go in the quarter and went on to win, 28-17. The game
was played in Atlanta on November 23, 1980. It was the opinion of the television broadcast-
ers at the time that the Bears would have won the game should the call have been made
correctly and the Bears followed up with the score.
27. THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, OFFICIAL RULES OF THE NATIONAL
BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 1980-81, at 16 (1980) (hereinafter cited as NBA RULES), re-
printed in NBA GUIDE, supra note 21.
28. Id. at 35.
29. Id. at 16.
30. Id. at 33.
31. Id. at 33-34, 37.
32. Id. at 41.
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3. Professional Hockey
Game officials have more power in hockey than in the other two
sports discussed above. They can choose from a variety of penalties, in
varying degrees of severity. The most common penalty is a "minor,"
imposed for numerous infractions of the rules. This penalty requires
the offending player to serve two minutes in the "Penalty Box," while
his team is not permitted to substitute for him, leaving it "short-
handed." The player returns to the ice after the penalty is over, bring-
ing his team up to full strength.33
A "major" penalty requires the player to sit out for five minutes,
leaving his team short-handed for that period. A fine of $50 is auto-
matically imposed for major penalties involving injury of one player's
head/face by another's use of the stick.34 Upon the third misconduct
penalty in the same game, the player is ejected for the duration of that
game and is fined $100. 35
"Misconduct" penalties remove the player from action for ten
minutes, but the team is allowed to substitute for him. An automatic
fine of $50 is imposed.36
"Game Misconduct" or "Gross Misconduct" penalties suspend the
player of other official from participation in the remainder of the game
and fine the offender $100. 3 ' A sufficient number of misconduct penal-
ties in successive games will automatically suspend the player for a fol-
lowing game.38 It is only at this penalty level that the League President
is notified for possible further action.39
"Match" penalties are the most severe. They suspend the player
from the game immediately, carry with them a $200 fine and a report to
the League President.' Under the rules, the President MUST investi-
gate the circumstances surrounding these penalties, in order to deter-
mine whether additional sanctions are required.4'
The NHL recently added strength to its rules on enforcement of
player safety in Rule 49, which automatically suspends any player who
deliberately tries to injure an opponent, until the League President
33. The NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, 1980-81 OFFICIAL RULE BOOK of the NATIONAL
HOCKEY LEAGUE, at 30-31 (1980) (hereinafter cited as NHL RULES).
34. Id. at 3 1.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 32.
37. Id. at 32-33.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 33-34.
41. Id. at 34.
1982)
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rules on the matter.42
B. League-Imposed Penalties
It is at this level that the real fireworks should begin. The poten-
tial for discipline at this level, however, has remained more potential
than reality. Nevertheless, these procedures have been described as a
"system of private criminal law, practically without procedural safe-
guard at the fiat of the owners."
43
1. Professional Football
The player consents to League discipline by signing his contract.
Section 15 of the NFL Player's Contract" states in part:
Player . . . acknowledges his awareness that if he . . . is
guilty of any other form of conduct reasonably judged by the
League Commissioner to be detrimental to the League or pro-
fessional football, the Commissioner will have the right, but
only after giving Player the opportunity for a hearing at
which he may be represented by counsel of his choice, to fine
Player in a reasonable amount; to suspend Player for a period
certain or indefinitely; and/or to terminate his contract. 5
Thus, the player can be penalized, at the Commissioner's discre-
tion, for something "detrimental" to the game, though what is detri-
mental is left undefined. Tatum, fined for violent actions in a game
against the Pittsburgh Steelers in 1976, complains: "At the hearing Ro-
zelle said that the charges were 'unnecessary roughness,' and then he
said that I had acted 'unprofessionally.' Pete Rozelle and his lawyers
were vague about everything."'  Later, Tatum wrote:
I wasn't guilty of unnecessary roughness or unsportsmanlike
conduct. I was a victim of the system and resented it. I re-
sented even more the fact that Rozelle wasn't interested in my
side of the story. The verdict was in and I was guilty regard-
less of favorable evidence or the NFL's lack of proof that a
crime has been committed. 7
42. HOCKEY RULES ILLUSTRATED 58 (1982) (reprinting the official rules of the National
Hockey League).
43. HORROW, supra note 2, at 65.
44. The NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NFL PLAYER CONTRACT sec. 15, reprinted in
The Practicing Law Institute, Representing Professional Athletes and Teams 1980, at 11-14
(1980) (hereinafter cited as NFL CONTRACT).
45. Id.
46. TATUM, supra note 10, at 40.
47. Id. at 41.
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Even casting vagueness and proof problems aside, the question
arises as to the stiffness of the penalties and whether they really deter
individual players from repeating the same violent conduct. Consider-
ing the high salaries paid to players today, a relatively small fine will
have little effect,48 especially if these fines are paid for by the teams.49
One article concluded that "the token fine or penalty has been ineffec-
tual in eliminating violence in sports."5 A typical illustration was pro-
vided in the case of one NFL player who was suspended for one game
and fined $2,000 in 1977. His response: "It don't faze me at all."'"
The Commissioner, as noted above, has the power to suspend or
terminate the player as well. This is certainly a more drastic measure
and is rarely used.52 Nevertheless, there is sentiment that this type of
penalty would be the most effective in stopping "criminal activity" on
the field.5 3 Consider that suspending a player requires the team to fill
in with other players, probably of inferior skill to the one suspended; it
hurts the player suspended in that his skills, both technical and compet-
itive, are dulled by the suspension period and disturbs the play of the
team as a whole, both on and off the field: on the field, as a part in a
complex larger machine must be replaced, and off, as other players re-
alize that similar conduct could also rob them of portions of their ca-
reers. Additionally, suspensions without pay would hurt the
pocketbook of the individual player, perhaps seriously. This effect is
far greater than simply imposing stiff fines and at least one player feels
that these measures are necessary companions to a system of fines
alone.54 But the possibilities are a matter for academic discussion only
until and unless the Commissioner exercises this power in the future.55
48. Id. at 184; HORROW, supra note 2, at 75. The average salary for NFL players during
the 1980-81 season was listed at a $78,600. Los Angeles Times, Mar. 17, 1981, sec. 3, at I
(bar graph) (hereinafter cited as Salary Survey).
49. HORROW, supra note 2, at 75.
50. Flakne, supra note 15, at 33. See also TATUM, supra note 10, at 184; Horrow, supra
note 2, 109.
51. 12 GA. L. REV. 380, 390 n. 55 (1978).
52. HORROW, supra note 2, at 78 n. 336, stating that no player has ever been suspended
for life by the NFL, nor have suspensions ever been appealed in court.
53. Id. at 109; TATUM, supra note 10, at 184.
54. TATUM, supra note 10, at 184. See also the comments of Green Bay quarterback
Lynn Dickey after sustaining nerve damage to his spine from a tackle by Detroit defensive
end William Gay. Los Angeles Times, Oct. 28, 1981, sec. 3, at 4.
55. Even if the Commissioner should exercise his power, there are player grievance pro-
cedures, installed as a result of pressure from the NFL Player Association. See HORROW,
supra note 2, at 78-109.
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2. Professional Basketball
The NBA Standard Player Contracts56 state that the Player agrees
"not to do anything which is detrimental to the best interests of the
Club or of the Association."57 This is another example of the vague-
ness which pervaded the NFL Player Contract clauses above. Portions
of the NBA Constitution reprinted to accompany the Contract are
equally vague. Subsections of section 35 allow the Commissioner to
impose fines of up to $1,000 for conduct "prejudicial or detrimental to
the Association."58 These fines may also be accompanied or replaced
by suspensions. Decisions of the Commissioner made under these sec-
tions may be appealed to the NBA Board of Governors, who will deter-
mine the merit of the appeal "in accordance with such rules and
regulations as may be adopted by the Board in its absolute and sole
discretion." 9
It is worthwhile to again examine the merit of fines as tool for
player discipline, in light of their primary mention in the preceding
disciplinary sections. The largest fine that the Commissioner can im-
pose under these provisions is $1,000. Yet, the average salary in the
NBA during the 1980-81 season was $185,000!60 Is it any wonder that
professional basketball players probably pay as little attention to
league fines imposed under this section as the football players men-
tioned above?
There are stiffer penalties for more specific conduct contained in
the playing rules. Importantly, fighting carries with it the possibility of
a fine of up to $10,000 for each player involved, imposed by the Com-
missioner "at his sole discretion."'" A suspension may be added to or
imposed in place of the fine, also at the sole discretion of the
Commissioner.
The "heavy" fine was invoked in recent years to counteract a
flagrant incident in a season-opening game between Los Angeles and
Milwaukee. After a particularly hard elbow to his midsection from
Milwaukee center Kent Benson, Laker center Kareem Abdul-Jabbar
56. THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACTS, re-
printed in The Practicing Law Institute, Representing Professional Athletes and Teams 1980,
at 29-64 (1980) (hereinafter cited as NBA CONTRACT).
57. Id. at 30.
58. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION CONST., sec. 35, reprinted in The Practicing
Law Institute, Representing Professional Athletes and Teams 1980, at 36-38 (1980) (hereinaf-
ter cited as NBA CONST.). See especially subsection (d) at 37.
59. Id. at 37-38.
60. Salary Survey, supra note 47.
61. NBA RULES, supra note 27, at 37.
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retaliated with a punch to Benson's face that broke Abdul-Jabbar's
right hand. Subsequently, both players missed numerous games, and
Abdul-Jabbar was fined $5,000.62 Later in the same season, Laker for-
ward Kermit Washington restructured Rudy Tomjanovich's face in a
one-punch incident that eventually led to a court battle and later, an
out-of-court settlement. In addition to being traded from the Lakers to
Boston and facing court battles for the next several years, Washington
was suspended by the League for 60 days and fined the maximum
$10,000.63 Based on these and other examples,' it can be said that the
NBA, through Commissioner Lawrence O'Brien, is at least making an
effort to respond to on-court violence with available penalties. Consid-
ering the above-mentioned average salary, however, query whether
these penalties are stiff enough to stem on-court violence in the NBA?
Though time will provide the ultimate answer, it seems obvious that
many NBA players cannot afford to suffer repeated $10,000 penalties,
along with suspensions from pay and salary, during a season. NBA
basketball is the least violent of the three sports here considered; part of
that is no doubt due to the nature of the game itself. It may also be due
to an aggressive stance against violence in the rules and an equally te-
nacious application of those rules by the League executives.
65
3. Professional Hockey
It is here that the ratio of violence to league action seems to be out
of alignment. The NHL President, like the other League executives
noted above, has power to: "[A]ssess additional fines and/or suspen-
sions for any offense committed during the course of a game or any
aftermath thereof by a player, trainer, manager, Coach or Club Execu-
tive whether or not such offense has been penalized by the Referee."
66
The rules relating to attempts to injure,67 kick a player 68 or deliberately
62. See 12 GA. L. REV. 380, 390 n.55 (1978). The game in which Abdul-Jabbar slugged
Benson took place on October 18, 1977 and was won by Milwaukee, 117-112.
After assessing the fine, Commissioner Lawrence O'Brien stated, "Every player in the
NBA is on notice that I oppose fighting during games, no matter what the provocation. I
will use all the powers of my office to prevent violence within the NBA." Id.
63. Torts in Sports, supra note 1, at 768 nn.25-28.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see also note 61, supra. The NBA was paid a compliment in this regard by
another professional athlete: NFL quarterback Lynn Dickey of the Green Bay Packers.
Dickey, complaining about the violence in his sport, said: "There used to be a problem with
fighting in the NBA. They wanted it stopped, so when Rudy Tomjanovich was hurt, the
penalty that was handed down was very severe, and there has not been much of a problem
with fighting in the NBA since." Los Angeles Times, Oct. 28, 1981, sec. 3, at 4.
66. NHL RULES, supra note 33, rule 34A.
67. Id., rule 44.
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injure opponents69 allow for Match penalties to be imposed, which trig-
gers a mandatory investigation by the League President.7" Although
these tools provide a vehicle through which to provide severe disci-
pline, the discipline meted out has had absolutely no deterrent effect,
judging by the increasingly violent behavior exhibited in the NHL in
the past season.
After the ignominious game between the Boston and Minnesota
teams noted above, that produced a record total of 406 penalty min-
utes, the League office got busy with determining what possible disci-
plinary action should be handed out. Three weeks later, the league
announced the suspension of two players for two games each, plus
some additional fines levied on the teams, and a $1,000 fine on Minne-
sota coach Glen Sonmor of his conduct FOLLOWING THE GAME!
7 1
These penalties, of course, were in addition to those imposed at the
time of the incident, but as noted above, any penalties imposed by
game officials can only run a maximum of $200 per infraction. Thus,
the maximum dollar penalty that any player probably suffered from
the biggest brawl in NHL history was necessarily limited thoroughly
$1,000. The entire dollar penalty imposed on all parties, including the
teams themselves, did not total much over $10,000.72
Yet, in response to an attack by NHL players on paying fans in the
seats, the League fined 19 players and suspended three players for 20
games each.73 The implication is obvious that the League is willing to
tolerate violence on the ice, but draws the line when the players start
attacking the paying customers. This mentality is reflected in a March,
1981 article in the Los Angeles Times that quoted statements by
League President John Ziegler:
How do fans feel about violence? Well, one barometer
may be the attendance of the pugnacious Philadelphia Flyers,
68. Id., rule 64.
69. Id., rule 49.
70. Id., rule 30.
71. Los Angeles Times, Mar. 17, 1981, sec. 3, at 4.
72. Id. Further examples of severe actions on the ice that met with moderate response
from the NHL are numerous. A good summary of incidents and penalties handed out dur-
ing the 1980-81 season is found in the Los Angeles Times, Oct. 29, 1981 sec. 3, at 2, 16.
During the 1981-82 season, NHL game officials were incensed at the leniency of a penalty
handed down against a player for hitting a referee! A coach who saw the incident in ques-
tion reacted to the penalty (a five-game suspension and $500 fine) by saying: "Officials had
better start wearing cages and everything, because they're not getting the backing from the
League." Los Angeles Times, Dec. 17, 1981, Sec. 3, at 14.
73. Los Angeles Times, Mar. 1, 1981, sec. 3, at 13.
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who sell out every game at home and are the league's biggest
attraction on the road.
Ziegler certainly has taken note of this fact. "If the other
20 teams were as successful, I'd be pleased, regardless of how
they achieved such success." 74
With the NHL's highest official voicing such a pro-violence atti-
tude, it is little wonder that many NHL games are more and more vio-
lent. Ziegler defended fighting in hockey games before the House
Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Crime,75 making him
the only top executive in the three sports examined here to endorse the
explosion of violence in his sport.76 Other hockey executives do not
share Ziegler's high enthusiasm for riots on the ice. One, Minnesota
General Manager Lou Nanne, a former NHL player, has called for an
end to NHL fighting and has given some thought on how to accomplish
this goal. Specifically, Nanne would immediately make sure that play-
ers pay their own fines, and are not reimbursed by their clubs. "When
it comes out of the player's pocket, see how long the fighting lasts."77
This is an interesting comment in light of section 18 of the NHL Stan-
dard Player's Contract, which requires that "all fines imposed upon the
Player under the Playing Rules, .. shall be deducted from the salary
of the Player."78
C. The Civil Suit
Given the inadequacies of the anti-violence procedures of the
sports bodies outlined above, the injured player has few choices: He
can forget about his injuries and "play with pain," writing off injuries
74. Los Angeles Times, Mar. 24, 1981, sec. 3, at 1. See also Los Angeles Times, Mar. I,
1981, sec. 3, at 13, where Times writer Gordon Edes quotes New York Times columnist
Dave Anderson, commenting on Ziegler's statements that appeared in the above-cited
March 24 L.A. Times story: "Anderson calls Ziegler 'the Socrates of the sellout.'" Cf.
Brooks, The Team Thai People Just Love to Hate, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 17, 1980, at
34.
75. Los Angeles Times, Mar. 24, 1981, Sec. 3, at I.
76. For the NBA reaction, see note 61, supra. The NFL also states that it is against
unnecessary on-field violence, but cf. 126 Cong. Rec. E3712 (daily ed. July 31, 1980);
Hechter, supra note I, at 437 n.60 ("Brutality is profitable; the NFL's mystique of raw, ex-
plosive fury has filled stadiums and sweled T.V. audiences to 100 million a week.");
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352, 354-55 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd and
remanded, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
77. See note 74, supra.
78. The NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, STANDARD PLAYER'S CONTRACT sec. 18 (1974
form), reprinted in The Practicing Law Institute, Representing Professional Athletes and
Teams 1980, at 67 (1980) (hereinafter cited as NHL CONTRACT).
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as just another occupational hazard,79 or he can take his case to the
newspapers in hopes of gaining sympathy.80 But to get monetary re-
dress outside of whatever Worker's Compensation or insurance benefits
might be available, the player must go to court and file suit in tort.
1. The Pressure Not to File
There is undeniable pressure on the player not to file suit. Dwight
White, a down lineman for the Pittsburgh Steelers of the NFL, ex-
pressed the prevailing attitude among his peers when he told one com-
mentator that he is vehemently opposed to intervention by the legal
system into his profession."' The biggest fear seems to be that "the
minute the courts have the power to litigate the game, a Pandora's Box
will be opened." 2
There is also a more personal fear among players that they'll be
tagged with a "clubhouse lawyer" label, a reputation so repulsive to
players that they will shun litigation to avoid it.8 3 If the player does go
ahead and press on with his suit, he can expect little or no help from his
Player's Association, leaving him to his own designs.84
2. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.
If a player should overcome the attitudes, fears and obstacles that
block his path to litigation, he will find that the civil court provides
obstacles to recovery as well.
The leading American case on the subject is Hackbart v. Cincinnati
Bengals, Inc. 85 Briefly, the facts were that during a game between the
Denver Broncos and the Cincinnati Bengals, a pass was intercepted by
a Denver player near the Denver goal line. 6 Hackbart, a free safety
with the Broncos, was blocked by Charles "Booby" Clark, and then
79. See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. at 355; see also Tatum, supra
note 10, at 169; Horrow, supra note 2, at 12-18; Hechter, supra note 1, at 437-38.
80. See TATUM, supra note 10, at 34-39.
81. See Hechter, supra note 1, at 438.
82. See HORROW, supra note 2, at 45, quoting Washington Capitals (NHL) Public Rela-
tions Director Pierce Gardner. See generally, HORROW at 43-63.
83. Id. at 50-5 1.
84. Id. at 59-61.
85. 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979). This is the leading case dealing with professional athletes.
There are others dealing with the amateur. See the cases exhaustively collected in LAW OF
SPORTS, supra note 1, at 184-90, 933-51.
86. Billy Thompson, the Denver free safety, made the interception. 601 F.2d at 519.
The game was played in Denver, Colorado, on September 16, 1973 and was won by the
Broncos, 28-10.
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struck by Clark, using his right forearm, across the back of Hackbart's
head. Both players fell to the ground as a result of the blow and the
momentum required to deliver it. No penalty was called, and both
players returned to their team areas. Hackbart complained of some
soreness, but was able to play on succeeding Sundays without
incident.87
Later in the season, Hackbart was released by Denver and was not
claimed by any other team. Upon a medical examination after his re-
lease, he discovered his neck injury and was paid his full season's sal-
ary by Denver under an injury clause in his contract. 8
It was at this time, after he had finished his playing career 9 that
Hackbart filed suit, asking for damages under a tort theory of liability.
The trial court' found that:
(I)n the context of common community standards there
can be no question but that Mr. Clark's blow here would gen-
erate civil liability. It would involve criminal liability if the
requisite intent were present. The difference here is that this
blow was delivered on the field of play during the course of
action during a regularly scheduled professional football
game ....
My conclusion (is) that the civil courts cannot be ex-
pected to control the violence in professional football .... 1
The case was appealed to the Tenth Circuit, and reversed. The
Court held specifically that the Federal courts cannot duck this type of
case simply because it springs from activity on the professional football
field. Reviewing the authorities,92 the Court noted prior Supreme
Court decisions93 declaring that where a federal court has jurisdiction,
it must take it. In determining whether there was jurisdiction in the
diversity case before it, the Tenth Circuit explained that Colorado law
87. These were strong men. Plaintiff Hackbart was a 13-year professional player, stood
6-3 and weighed 210 pounds. Defendant Clark was in his rookie season as a professional,
stood 6-1 3/4 and weighed 240. Hackbart was 35 years old and Clark was 23. 435 F. Supp. at
353.
88. 601 F.2d at 519. Cf. NFL CONTRACT, supra note 43, cl. 9.
89. Note that Hackbart had finished his playing career before he filed suit. Because of
this, he eluded much of the "in-house" pressure not to file discussed above. See generally
HoRgow, supra note 2, at 43-63.
90. The District Court opinion was reported at 435 F. Supp. 352.
91. 435 F. Supp. at 358.
92. 601 F.2d at 521-22.
93. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.,
212 U.S. 19 (1909).
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requires its courts to protect a right under the law if one exists, and that
the jurisdiction of the state district court to protect such rights is unlim-
ited.94 The Court noted that the Colorado Constitution provides for a
remedy for every injury to person, property or character.9" Accord-
ingly, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Colorado state courts.
Of course, "[I]n a diversity case the federal court inherits the jurisdic-
tional scope that is enjoyed by the state court within the district,"9 6 and
"sits as a state trial court and applies the law of the forum state." 97
Applying Justice Peckham's majority view in Willcox v. Consolidated
Gas Co. 98 that the "right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court
where there is a choice cannot be properly denied,"9 9 the Court of Ap-
peals held that the District Court was required to take jurisdiction over
the case and try the cause on its merits."°
In setting the standard for liability, the Tenth Circuit held that
recovery in tort was proper under the Colorado' 0' tort standard of
reckless misconduct.10 2 The Circuit Court's characterization of the re-
covery standard: "recklessness exists where a person knows that the act
is harmful but fails to realize that it will produce the extreme harm
which it did produce."10 3
The Circuit Court dispensed with the notion of an absolute as-
sumption of the risk by the plaintiff, a theory supported by the trial
court.' 04 Assumption of the Risk is based on consent. The leading
California case on the subject, Vierra v. Fifth Avenue Rental Service,'05
94. 601 F.2d at 524.
95. 601 F.2d at 523.
96. Id.
97. 601 F.2d at 522. See generally, C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK of the LAw of FEDERAL
COURTS, at 249-86 (3rd ed. 1976).
98. 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
99. Id. at 40, quoted at 601 F.2d at 521-22.
100. 601 F.2d at 522.
101. Remembering that this was a diversity suit, filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado (the game took place in Denver).
102. Expressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS, sec. 500 (1965). See 435 F. Supp.
355.
103. 601 F.2d at 524.
104. 435 F. Supp. at 356. Query whether the court actually meant to apply Assumption
of the Risk. This doctrine is used as a defense against negligence, rather than against inten-
tional interference with another, such as Clark's act against Hackbart. See W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK of the LAw of TORTS secs. 18, 34 (4th ed. 1971) (hereinafter cited as Prosser). In
any case, an analysis of Assumption of the Risk discusses the consent problem, as the doc-
trine is based on consent. Id. at 440. Thus, though the court might have more properly
discussed the defense of Consent, the ground was covered in the analysis of Assumption of
the Risk.
105. 60 Cal. 2d 266, 383 P.2d 777, 32 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1963).
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states that, "Before the doctrine is applicable, the victim must have not
only general knowledge of a danger, but must have knowledge of the
particular danger, that is, knowledge of the magnitude of the risk in-
volved. '' 1°6 The Tenth Circuit in Hackbart exploded any contention
that professional football players know of or have any expectation of
facing the risks Hackbart did:
The general customs of football do not approve the in-
tentional punching or striking of others. That this is prohib-
ited was supported by the testimony of all the witnesses. They
testified the intentional striking of a player in the face or from
the rear is prohibited by the playing rules as well as the gen-
eral customs of the game. Punching or hitting with the arms
is prohibited. Undoubtedly these restraints are intended to
establish reasonable boundaries so that one football player
cannot intentionally inflict serious injury on another. There-
fore, the notion is not correct that all reason has been aban-
doned, whereby the only possible remedy for the person who
has been the victim of an unlawful blow is retaliation.
10 7
Thus, the Hackbart case has paved the way for future cases to be
heard on the subject of tort liability for violence in professional sports.
The standard for recovery in Colorado, based on the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, section 500, 18 is representative of much of the law
throughout the nation. ' 9 Equally important, the Tenth Circuit gutted
the defense of assumption of the risk, which, if treated with as much
deference as the District Court in Hackbart gave it, would have pre-
vented recovery in every such suit.
3. The Meaning of Hackbart for the Potential Litigant
Although the nation's potential sporting plaintiffs won a collective
victory under the Hackbart holding, the road is still bumpy. The nor-
mal pitfalls of any civil suit still lie ahead.
Hackbart's injury occurred in 1973, yet the opinion in the trial
court was not filed until August of 1977. The Tenth Circuit did not file
its opinion, granting a remand, until June 11, 1979. Even more time
was involved in an unsuccessful attempt at gaining certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court."10 Thus, the ever-present problem of
106. 60 Cal. 2d at 271, 383 P.2d at 780, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
107. 601 F.2d at 521.
108. RESTATEMENT SECOND of TORTS sec. 500 (1965).
109. PROSSER, supra note 103, at 184-86.
110. 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
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waiting years to get a judgment at the trial court level is a powerful
factor to deter sports violence victims from becoming plaintiffs."'
Against this demand for patience, there are many possible advan-
tages for the potential litigant:
(1) The evidentiary standard is preponderance of the evidence,
rather than the stiff "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of the crimi-
nal courts.112
(2) He can go after the "deep pocket," the football club; a victory
would almost always insure payment as few clubs are completely judg-
ment-proof. 113
(3) By joining the individual who caused his injury, the plaintiff
can deter that defendant from further like conduct on the field. Natu-
rally, a judgment against club and player defendants in a state with
joint and several liability would bring the message home to the defend-
ants in a financial way on both the individual and corporate levels.
(4) The threat of large judgments against the corporate entity
would necessitate instruction by club management to the coaching staff
to keep players from engaging in the sort of violent contact that might
result in potential liability. No such training was evident at the time of
the Hackbart trial as was emphasized by the coaches of the Denver and
111. See TIME, Apr. 20, 1981, at 51. The article stated that in California, "it takes more
than four years for the average civil jury suit to reach trial."
112. See generally, C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK of the LAW of EVIDENCE sec. 339 (2d ed.
1971); as to the criminal standard specifically, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
113. Of course, if the team pays, the resulting deterrent effect on the player may be les-
sened greatly, unless the team decides that it can less afford to allow the player to continue
his present style of play than to pay large sums in damages as a result of it. In that instance,
management will be sure that the player either conforms his conduct to that which does not
result in a large judgment against the team, or will drop him from the team. In the
Hackbart case, the District Court opinion reported that witnesses Paul Brown and John
Ralston, both coaches of professional football teams, "emphasized that the coaching of pro-
fessional football players did not include any training with respect to a responsibility or even
any regard for the safety of opposing players." 435 F. Supp. at 355-56. Thus, it is not yet
prudent for professional teams to "pull back the reins" on their players. But at least one
commentator suggests, "[t]he best means of deterring violence in professional sports is to
make it unprofitable." Torts in Sports, supra note 1, at 791-92.
A probable barometer of the effectiveness of large civil judgments against a professional
player and his sports club will be the final judgment in the suit by former Detroit hockey
player Dennis Polonich against Wilf Paiement and his then-team, the Colorado Rockies. In
an October 25, 1978 game at Detroit, Paiement struck Polonich with his stick, causing a
broken nose, concussion and multiple cuts. The blows caused Polonich's face to be perma-
nently disfigured, and have caused breathing problems. Paiement was suspended for 15
games, the longest penalty for on-ice violence ever imposed by the NHL. Four years later, a
U.S. District Court jury awarded Polonich (now a minor league player) $500,000 in actual
damages and $350,000 in exemplary damages. An appeal will undoubtedly follow. See Los
Angeles Times, Aug. 18, 1982, sec 3, at 4.
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Cincinnati teams in sworn testimony." 4
This very beneficial social side-effect of successful civil litigation
could be cut short, however, by the availability of liability insurance for
the teams.
However, there are other possible problems for the potential civil
litigant: The player currently engaged in the middle of his career might
find himself "blacklisted" because of filing suit and unable to find em-
ployment." 5 Many players apparently feel that retribution against
"troublemakers" will be swift and real." 6 If this happens, the plaintiff
may have won the "battle," but lost the "war," by having his career cut
short.
Additionally, the civil litigant must be careful to examine the law
of the jurisdiction in which he files suit. Without a national rule, the
law in each state could conceivably be different enough to prevent re-
covery in one state, while allowing it in another. The unfortunate re-
sult of this is forum-shopping. A by-product is a series of uneven and
possibly inconsistent holdings, which would restrain the deterrent
effect. i'
The conclusion of a thoughtful recent commentary about civil liti-
gation and tortious conduct by professional athletes on the field of play
reaches the same unfortunate conclusion that the District Judge did in
the Hackbart case: "The civil forum alone cannot rid professional
sports of unnecessary violence."" '  Yet the commentator expresses
hope that the civil forum can assist strengthened intra-league discipli-
nary measures to reduce the amount of violence now so prevalent in
professional sports today.' ' For some, however, the civil forum is not
strong enough to provide the needed impetus for reform.
IV. THE HISTORY OF CRIMINAL PENALTIES IN THE SPORTS
VIOLENCE CONTEST AND THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL
CRIMINAL RULE IN THE AREA
With the growing awareness of the problem of violence in profes-
sional sports, 20 and the candid admission of the Colorado District
114. 435 F. Supp. at 355-56. See note 112 supra.
115. See Torts in Sports, supra note 1, at 791; HORROW, supra note 2, at 43-63.
116. See HoRRow, supra note 2, at 52-63.
117. This has already been recognized. See Torts in Sports, supra note 1, at 791.
118. Torts in Sports, supra note 1, at 792.
119. Id. at 792-93.
120. See the massive bibliography in HORROW, supra note 2, at 251-58, 259-63, and addi-
tional sources cited in Torts in Sports, supra note 1.
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Court in Hackbart that the defendant Charles Clark's conduct would
have been criminal if the required intent were present 12' (an issue not
before the court and therefore not decided), 22 the cry has gone up to
stop the slugfest. The prosecutor in State v. Forbes,123 the best-known
American criminal case ever prosecuted against a professonal athlete
for malicious violence on the playing field, wrote:
The mere act of putting on a uniform and entering the
sports arena should not serve as a license to engage in behav-
ior which would constitute a crime if committed else-
where. . . . It is ludicrous to think that anything short of
criminal sanctions will deter conduct that is criminal in its
character. 124
To better understand the need for, and the background of, crimi-
nal prosecution of professional sports figures for on-field violence, brief
studies must be made of the Canadian and American experiences in
this field in the past. Following that, an examination of the Mottl bill
will reveal its potential for lessening this growing national problem.
A. The Canadian Experience
The leading cases in this area are two that arose from the same
incident.' 25 In a 1969 exhibition game between the Boston Bruins and
the St. Louis Blues, the Bruins' Edward "Ted" Green and Blues player
Wayne "Chico" Maki became involved in a shoving match behind the
Boston goal.' 26 Soon after, Maki apparently speared Green by poking
his stick into Green's lower abdomen, but this is a matter of some
doubt. 12 7 Conffict between the players continued, ending when Maki
raised his stick high, then smashed Green's head with it.' 28 Green, of
121. 435 F. Supp. at 358.
122. Clark admitted at trial that the blow itself was intentional, although he had no spe-
cific intent to injure. He stated that his anger and frustration were brought about by the fact
that his team was losing the game, 21-3, at the time the blow was struck. 601 F.2d at 519.
Compare this admitted intent of Clark with the intent standard required for prosecution
under the Mottl bill discussed infra.
123. State v. Forbes, No. 63280 (Minn. Dist. Ct., dismissed Aug. 12, 1975.)
124. Flakne, supra note 15, at 35.
125. Regina v. Maki, 14 D.L.R.3d 164 (Ont. Provincial Ct. 1970) and Regina v. Green, 16
D.L.R.3d 137 (Ont. Provincial Ct. 1970). Other cases have been far less consequential.
They are collected in Torts in Sports, supra note 1, at 771 & n.55. See also Hechter, supra
note 1, at 425-26 & nn. 2-5.
126. 14 D.L.R.3d at 164-65; 16 D.L.R.3d at 138.
127. 14 D.L.R.3d at 164-65; 16 D.L.R.3d at 138-39.
128. 14 D.L.R.3d at 165; 16 D.L.R.3d at 138. It cannot be emphasized how truly vicious
this blow was. According to sources gathered by Rick Horrow,
Green, then a Boston Bruin, "came off the boards and cuffed (Maki) with the back
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course, received a serious injury.
29
The first case, Regina v. Maki, 13 ° dismissed the charges against
Maki on the grounds of self-defense. The Judge could not there find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Maki intended to injure Green.' 3 '
The companion case, Regina v. Green,'32 found Green innocent on a
self-defense theory.'33
Although the holdings in both cases acquitted the defendants,
dicta in each expressly approved the possibility of criminal convictions
in future cases. In Maki, the opinion noted that, "[n]o sports league, no
matter how well organized or self-policed it may be, should thereby
render players in that league immune from criminal prosecution."'
134
Limitations on the consent defense were also expressly recognized, in
that, "no athlete should be presumed to accept malicious, unprovoked
or overly violent attack."1
35
The opinion in Green, issued six months later, echoed the same
refrain. While the judge there thought it unlikely that convictions
could be based on the type of 'technical assaults' so common in profes-
sional hockey, he distinguished "unprovoked savage attacks in which
serious injury results."'' 36 Clearly, the common thread between the two
opinions lies in the belief that professional athletes could be criminally
liable for the type of conduct labelled above as "malicious, unprovoked
or overly violent."'
' 37
This was confirmed in 1982. Winnipeg Jets player Jimmy Mann
earned a ten-game suspension for breaking the jaw of Pittsburgh Pen-
guin player Paul Gardener during the course of an on-ice fight.' 3
Four months later, Mann pled guilty to a charge of "assault causing
of his glove." Maki retaliated with his stick, "coming straight overhead like a log-
ger splitting a stump." Milt Schmidt, the Bruin coach at the time, said it "was the
worst thing he ever saw in a hockey game. He fell like a cut log." Green sustained
a serious concussion and massive hemorraging. After two brain operations, he
regained only partial sensation and "has never recovered 100 percent."
HORROW, supra note 2, at 19 (footnotes omitted). The judge in Regina v. Green, 16
D.L.R.3d 137 (Ont. Provincial Ct. 1970) quite properly recognized that the blow almost cost
Green his life. Id. at 141.
129. See note 127 supra.
130. 14 D.L.R.3d 164 (Ont. Provincial Ct. 1970).
131. 14 D.L.R.3d at 166.
132. 16 D.L.R.Zd 137 (Ont. Provincial Ct. 1970).
133. 16 D.L.R.3d at 142-43.
134. 14 D.L.R.3d at 167.
135. Id.
136. 16 D.L.R.3d at 143. The Maki case was decided on March 4, 1970. The Green case
followed on September 3, 1970.
137. 14 D.L.R.3d at 167.
138. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 8, 1982, at I11.
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bodily harm" and was fined $500 by a Manitoba provincial judge.' 39
The Canadian criminal law thus appears to have drawn that fine line
between violent actions indigenous to professional hockey and conduct
outside the bounds of both the laws of the game, and of the society it is
played in.
B. State v. Forbes: The American Foray
The leading American criminal case on this topic never got past a
hung jury. 4 ° The defendant, NHL hockey player Dave Forbes, was
accused of "Aggravated Assault by Use of Dangerous Weapon" in
beating rival player Henry Boucha. la ' According to an article co-au-
thored by the prosecutor in the Forbes case,142 both Forbes and Boucha
were returning to their team areas from the penalty box when Forbes
approached Boucha from the right rear and, with hockey stick in hand,
punched Boucha's head. The stick struck Boucha just above the right
eye, stunning him and dropping him to the ice, bleeding. Forbes then
continued punching Boucha and slamming his head into the ice, until
finally restrained by another player.
43
The case went to trial later the same year. The defense was denied
instructions relating to assumption of the risk on the basis that that
defense was applicable solely to civil cases.'" The defense was granted
an instruction that one cannot consent, either expressly or by implica-
tion, to be the victim of a crime.' 45 The jury deliberated for 18 hours,
but could not reach the required unanimous verdict. It was subse-
quently determined that the jurors had split 9-3 in favor of conviction.
The prosecution decided not to re-prosecute for two reasons: first,
the initial trial had served notice to the sports world that conduct like
Forbes' would not be tolerated, at least in that jurisdiction; ' 46 and sec-
139. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 31, 1982, at 85.
140. State v. Forbes, No. 63280 (Minn Dist. Ct., dismissed Aug. 12, 1975). See Flakne,
supra note 15, at 34. The jury deliberated for 18 hours before conceding. Id.
141. Forbes played for the Boston Bruins, and Boucha for the Minnesota North Stars.
The game took place on January 4, 1975, in Bloomington, Minnesota.
142. Flakne & Caplan, Sports Violence and the Prosecution, TRIAL January, 1977, at 33.
At the time this article was published, Gary Flakne was the County Attorney for Hennepin
County, Mn. He prosecuted Dave Forbes.
143. See Flakne, supra note 15, at 34.
144. Id.
145. Id. This was the court's view of the law in Minnesota.
146. Id. Flakne wrote, "we had put the sports world on notice that acts involving inten-
tion to cause serious bodily injury to another will not be tolerated in our jurisdiction." Id.
Compare that with a quote from Forbes that appeared in the Philadelphia Inquirer: "I just
don't see, no matter how wrong the act is, how anything that happens in an athletic contest
can be criminal." Id.
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ond, there was a likelihood of ending with another hung jury.'4 7
In his subsequent article, the Forbes prosecutor, Gary Flakne, dis-
cussed the problems of the consent defense and prosecutorial discre-
tion, often cited as stumbling blocks in the path of effective criminal
prosecution of professional sports-related violence.' 48 While the fear of
many that criminal intervention into professional sport will bring a del-
uge of trivial suits,'49 suits that will downgrade the level of play,'
50
Flakne explains that the bringing of such suits is a waste that will not
be tolerated by prosecutors, either:
[T]he likelihood of prosecutions for technical violations
of the law on the part of a sports participant is virtually non-
existent. In the first place, it is unlikely that any jury would
be willing to convict under those circumstances and, secondly,
the prosecutor would not derive any support from the law.15'
Likewise, he asserts that the consent defense is not a barrier to
successful criminal prosecution in a proper case. Flakne states that the
consent defense has never been asserted successfully where the assault
has resulted in death,152 and that the same failure would occur in situa-
tions such as that of Forbes: serious injury caused by assaultive behav-
ior outside the rules of play. 5 3 Recognizing that broken bones and
other serious injuries are sometimes part of sports, even when played
within the rules, Flakne suggests that these instances of "legal assaults"
are eliminated by the necessity of criminal intent for conviction.
Accordingly,
[w]hether the defense of consent then may be raised success-
fully should be dependent on whether the injuries were occa-
sioned through an accident while the actor was in compliance
with the rules of the game or whether the injuries were in-
flicted under such circumstances that they tend to show a defi-
nite resolve on the part of the actor to cause a serious injury to
another. If the attendant circumstances tend to show that the
147. Id.
* 148. Hallowell & Meshbesher, Sports Violence and the Criminal Law, TRIAL, January,
1977, at 27 (hereinafter cited as Hallowell).
149. Id. at 29.
150. Flakne, supra note 15, at 35; see Regina v. Green, 16 D.L.R.3d 137, 141 (Ont. Pro-
vincial Ct. 1970).
151. Flakne, supra note 15, at 35. At least one commentator has also recognized the same
safeguards that Flakne has. Torts in Sports, supra note 1, at 775-76. No prosecutor is inter-
ested in bringing an action that has no chance of success. The immense criminal caseload
confronting many prosecutors assures this.
152. Flakne, supra note 15, at 35. Cf. R. Perkins, Criminal Law 109 (2d Ed. 1969).
153. Id.
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actor went beyond the scope of the rules of the game and pur-
posefully injured or attempted to injure his opponent, the de-
fense of consent should be unavailable. 1
54
C. The Motl Bill
Into this fray stepped Representative Ronald M. Mottl. 1" In
1980, he introduced H.R. 7903, the Sports Violence Act of 1980.156 It
was his response to the growing sports violence problem, and would
have dealt with it by adding a new section to Title 18 of the United
States Code:
Sec. 115 Excessive violence during professonal sports events
(a) Whoever, as a player in a professional sports event,
knowingly uses excessive physical force and thereby causes a
risk of significant bodily injury to another person involved in
that event shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both.
(b) As used in this section, the term-
(1) 'excessive physical force' means physical force
that-
(A) has no reasonable relationship to the com-
petitive goals of the sport;
(B) is unreasonably violent;
(C) could not be reasonably foreseen, or was
not consented to, by the injured person, as a normal hazard of
such person's involvement in such sports event; and
(2) 'professional sports event' means a paid-admis-
154. Flakne, supra note 15, at 35. See People v. Samuels, 250 Cal. App.2d 501, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 439 (1967).
The MODEL PENAL CODE, section 2.11(2), states,
(2) Consent to Bodily Harm. When conduct is charged to constitute an offense
because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the inflic-
tion of such harm is a defense if:
(a) the bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to
is not serious; or
(b) the conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint
participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport.
MODEL PENAL CODE sec. 2.11(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The formulation of the
consent test in sec. 2.1 1(2)(b) is almost identical to the test for "excessive physical force" in
the Mottl bill. See the textual discussion of the Mottl bill. See the textual discussion of the
Mottl bill infra.
155. Mottl is a Democrat from Parma, Ohio. See note 4, supra.
156. The bill died in committee, but was re-introduced in the following session as H.R.
2263, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). It was assigned to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
127 Cong. Rec. H760 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1981).
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sion contest, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of
players paid for their participation.'57
The bill never got out of committee. Mottl re-introduced it in the
following session of Congress, and it was again stalled in the House
Committee on the Judiciary, and the Judiciary Committee's Subcom-
mittee on Crime. 5 8
1. The Bill's Design
Mottl, in his statement to the Subcommittee on Crime, was very
specific as to the kinds of actions he intended to penalize through the
bill:
It is directed to the player who smashes a hockey stick
over the head of an opponent. This is not sport.
It is directed to the baseball player who drops his bat or
glove and raises his fists. This is not sport.
It is directed to the basketball player who crushes the
face of another with his fist. This is not sport.
It is directed to the lineman who deliberately slams into
and injures an opposing quarterback long after the play is
dead. This is not sport.
When we are looking at these extreme kinds of actions, I
have no doubt whatsoever that a carefully drawn federal stat-
ute can preserve the health and vitality of professional sports,
while serving notice on pro athletes that they have no license
to commit televised assault and battery.
59
The question is whether Mottl's bill was indeed that carefully
drawn statute.
2. The Bill's Probable Effectiveness
The merits of the bill must be judged in several categories to deter-
mine its probably overall impact, if enacted: ability to successfully
prosecute under the statute, the actual deterrent effect of the statute and
the impact on legitimate play in professional sports.
a. Possibility of Successful Prosecution
Basically, the bill sought to penalize physical force used in a pro-
fessional sports event that is so violent that it falls outside the rules or
157. H.R. 2263, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 2 (1981).
158. See note 153 supra.
159. See note 23 supra.
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normal customs of the game involved. This physical force must be ap-
plied "knowingly." Interestingly, there is nowhere a requirement of
injury itself. This is an important omission.
But not requiring serious injury, the pitfalls noted by Flakne 6 ° are
avoided in that much serious injury occurs from conduct well within
the rules and customs of many professional athletic contests in the
United States. Moreover, by requiring conduct that causes only a risk
of significant bodily injury, a risk that is practically insured by the use
of violent action outside the rules or customs of the sport, the bill seeks
to specifically deter not the rash of injuries that follow unnecessarily
violent conduct, but the unnecessary conduct itself. The bill properly
addresses itself to the root of the problem, not the fruit of its vine.
To prove such conduct, evidence presented at trial would have to
show the three statutory elements of "excessive physical force": physi-
cal force that has no reasonable relationship to the competitive goals of
the sport, is unreasonably violent and could not be reasonably foreseen,
or was not consented to, by the injured' 6' person, as a normal hazard of
such person's involvement in the sporting event.
For the instances of conduct Mottl cited above in his Statement to
the Subcommittee, there is no question but that such conduct: hockey
sticks smashed over the heads of opposing players, fistfights in baseball
or basketball and the like, have no relationship, reasonable or other-
wise, to the sports in which they occur. This is patently obvious from
the very nature of each sport. It is this very conduct, not the hard body
check in hockey or the hard shoulder tackle in football that is the whole
of the problem and the only conduct to which the bill's criminal sanc-
tions are directed. The first test should cause little trouble.
62
Likewise, the stick vs. head, fist vs. face, and helmet vs. knee
match-ups are so beyond the basic playing customs of each sport to
which they occur in, and are so vicious in every instance, that they can
easily be counted as unreasonably violent. While some may comment
that much violence will still remain as the word "unreasonably" is con-
tinually colored, it must be remembered that some sports, such as foot-
ball, are quite violent by nature. 63  It is not this violence that has
become a wide-spread problem. The problem comes in violence that is
outside the scope of the game as properly played. It is that violence
160. Flakne, supra note 15, at 35.
161. In this context, "injured" means one who was assaulted, whether or not battered, or
injured as a medical matter. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (5th ed. 1979).
162. Cf. the MODEL PENAL CODE section quoted at note 151 supra.
163. See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d at 520.
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which is unreasonable.164
The final item provides a possibly more difficult standard. The
actions must be unforeseeable or not consented to by the person in-
jured, 65 as a normal hazard of the sport participated in. There could
be a potentially difficult question for the trier of fact, determining what
the foreseeable hazards of a particular sport are, or determining exactly
what physical contact is and is not consented to. This question may be
especially perplexing in rough sports such as football and hockey. But
the question is not without answer.
The first part-the foreseeability test-is much the same as the
"reasonable relationship" test. Both are grounded in the rules and cus-
toms of the game. Again, the brutal violence that Mottl stated the bill
zeroes in on is clearly not foreseeable as a NORMAL hazard of a per-
son's involvement in a sports event. This is the case in professional
football as illustrated by the Hackbart decision in which the Tenth Cir-
cuit noted that all the evidence condemned defendant Clark's action as
well beyond proper conduct of a participant in a professional football
game. 166 Even if some violent conduct falls on the borderline, the in-
tent question should resolve the problem. While a participant might
reasonably foresee particular conduct in a game, he certainly could not
foresee, as a normal hazard of playing such game, the conduct being
knowingly inflicted.
Of course, it is possible to place a gloss on the meaning of "nor-
mal hazards," distorting it to represent those exceedingly violent acts
which are commonplace in sport today. For a court to do this would
simply disregard the bill's clear intent and rob the legislature of its con-
stitutional place as the lawmaking branch. 167 If the Congressional pur-
pose is clear, as here, the Court is without authority to give a statute
another meaning by interpretation.
68
The second clause of the subsection focuses on consent: whether
or not the injured participant consented to the violence against him as a
normal hazard of willingly participating in the game itself.
In considering the consent defense, one must remember that this
would be a criminal statute. In criminal cases, the general rule is that
164. Id.
165. See note 158 supra.
166. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d at 520-21.
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. i.
168. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 44 (1942); U.S. v. Durkee Famous Foods,
Inc., 306 U.S. 68, 71 (1939).
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consent is not a defense. 169 However, in crimes where lack of consent is
defined as part of the crime, as here, its existence can be a bar to con-
viction.170 Since professional athletes make no explicit agreement with
other players as to what conduct is and is not consented to, whatever
consent there is must be implicit. Logically, since the player's only con-
tract is with the Club and League to participate for payment in athletic
contests sponsored by the League,' 7 ' any implicit agreement from the
contract can cover only such conduct as is within the scope of the game
itself. Such scope is governed by the game's rules as adopted by the
League. Thus, the player's implicit consent is extended to all foresee-
able conduct engaged in under the rules of the game he plays.
17 2
Under this concept of consent, the test becomes "foreseeability," a test
already imposed in the prior clause of the subsection and discussed
above and shown to be ineffectual as a defense against extreme vio-
lence such as playing rail-splitter with a hockey stick on another's head.
Prosecution of athletes for the actions which Mottl sought to curtail
would thus not be derailed by a consent defense. Two leading com-
mentaries have agreed.1
7 3
The bill requires that such violence be "knowingly" inflicted. This
term generally means that the actor intentionally did an act which the
law forbids.'74 Applying that definition to a typical sports violence
case, the question for proof at trial would be whether the player, aware
of his conduct, delivered a blow which he knew to be "excessive physi-
169. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 408 (1972).
170. Id.
17 1. Interestingly, unless the player receives special consent from his League, he typically
cannot play any other sport professionally or engage in other sports that have a known risk
of injury as a normal hazard of that sport. See NFL CONTRACT, supra note 43, sec. 3; NBA
CONTRACT, supra note 55, sec. 17; NHL CONTRACT, supra note 77, sec 7.
172. See note 159 supra.
173. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 608 (1972); R. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW 109 (2d ed. 1969).
174. Record Revolution No. 6 v. City of Parma, 492 F. Supp. 1157, 1175 & n. 10 (N.D.
Ohio 1980); United States v. Sirhan, 504 F.2d 818, 819-20 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 1974).
(b) knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circum-
stances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is prac-
tically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
MODEL PENAL CODE sec. 2.02(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
The Mottl bill focused on "knowingly" as defined in (i) above, since the proposed stat-
ute dealt with the physical force applied by the athlete, rather than the result of the applica-
tion of such force.
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cal force," as defined above, i.e., outside the rules and customs of the
game he was playing. Such a question would be for the trier of fact,
and could be inferred from a number of sources: testimony, videotape
or films, photographs and the like.
It must be reiterated that while there is potential for some close
cases on the intent question, there is little doubt about the actions that
Mottl cited as examples of the acts that he wishes to stop via enactment
of his bill. Hockey sticks smashed over heads of players, fistfights in
basketball and baseball and spearing with the helmet in football have
all been outlawed for so long and are so well known to be beyond the
bounds of play that there can be no doubt as to whether a player
thought they were within the rules or customs of the game.
Concern has been voiced over the difficult question of whether a
jury would be able to decide if a particular player actually intended to
injure another with his blow(s).' 75 That question, however, is not ger-
mane to the jury's inquiry under the Mottl bill. The only question is
whether the player intended to deliver the blow itself, knowing that IT
was outside the rules and customs of the game. This is the essential
difference between penalizing conduct, as the Mottl bill did, and penal-
izing the results of that conduct.
17 6
Evidence to prove such conduct at trial could be massive. If any
group could be said to hold their events in the proverbial "fishbowl,"
professional sports would be the one. Each contest attracts thousands
of spectators, and most events are shown on television, either on net-
works or via cable systems. Additionally, media coverage usually in-
cludes numerous others who write for newspapers, broadcast on radio
and shoot films of the event. Most leagues and teams have film camer-
amen on hand to photograph events for posterity, either for a "game
library," scouting purposes or for highlight films and other promotional
activities. This mass of photographic material would be available for
court viewing if desired,'77 and, of course, would probably be admissi-
175. Torts in Sports, supra note 1, at 772.
176. See the analysis of MODEL PENAL CODE sec. 2.02(b) in note 171 supra.
177. One commentator has expressed doubts about this. See Torts in Sports, supra note I,
at 772 n. 60. Although that comment was published in 1980, the incredible, continuing
expansion of cable coverage of professional sporting events virtually assures that any partic-
ular game would be filed or taped. Although there remains the possibility that the availabil-
ity of only a single camera angle could distort the evidentiary value of the film or tape, the
sharp prosecutor would be aware that many games were shot with more than one camera,
and that the entire output of a camera which was never used to show an "on air" picture is
often saved on tape by the production company, until the game is over, as a matter of rou-
tine. These tapes are usually recorded over soon afterward, but would be available if the
prosecutor moved with vigor to obtain them.
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ble. 178 Although much can be said about possible distortion by use of
photographic evidence, the overwhelming mass of photographic evi-
dence probably available at any particular trial would eliminate most
of the problems of poor angle, blocked view and the like.
In sum, the bill's potential for successful use at trial appears good.
The quantum of proof required makes convictions for the serious acts
of violence noted above, allowing acquittals for acts engaged in that are
within the normal bounds of competitive play.
b. Deterrent Effect
The hope was, of course, that if the bill had been adopted as law, it
would rarely have to be used. Mottl's intent was to enlarge penalties
for on-field violence so that the violence will be eliminated. His bill
might have been the right tool to do this.'7 9
Had it passed, there would have been little doubt that players
would have had to restrain their tempers and end premeditated assaults
on chosen "targets."' 80 Further, individual players, knowing that they
themselves would be subject to criminal prosecution and the possible
infamy of conviction, would have had to pay closer attention to playing
techniques and strategies that emphasize skill and finesse, rather then
178. Fed. R. Evid. 401-403. See G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
17-39, 414-25 (1978).
179. The goal of H.R. 2263 was to penalize excessive physical force used in professional
athletic contests. If the offender is found guilty, he is punished, but the victim makes no
recovery. However, there is no reason that the victim cannot file a civil suit against the
offender and/or the club to obtain monetary recovery.
The deterrent effect of the Mottl bill works against the player himself. Others in the
club organization, such as the coach, management or even other players, would only become
involved (if not participants in the application of the physical force specified) through a
conspiracy charge. Such a charge would be extremely difficult to prove, see Torts in Sports,
supra note 1, at 774-75. But cf. Hechter, supra note 1, at 436: "During the Forbes trial
Hennepin County Attorney Flakne stressed that Boston's Bobby Schmautz skated by the
(penalty) box and said to the defendant, 'Get him the first chance you get, buddy.'" (foot-
note omitted). Immediately after Forbes left the penalty box, he attacked Boucha in the
incident that led to the criminal trial. In Hechter's opinion, "When fellow players and
coaches overtly conspire to do injury to the opposition, they conspire to commit crimes and
are subject to prosecution." Id. at 436.
The view has been expressed that it may be unfair to hold a single player solely respon-
sible for acts of violence occurring on the field. See Torts in Sports, supra note 1, at 777.
The same argument can be made for the prosecution of one suspect and not another based
on what the evidentiary prospects are against each. Whether fair or not, by pressing charges
against individual players, prosecutors will be able to enforce the policy against rampant
violence in sports embodied in the statute. Inability to "clean the slate" by eliminating all
offenders at once is hardly sufficient reason to not prosecute at all.
180. See TATUM, supra note 10, at 24-25, 28-29; Hechter, supra note 1, at 436.
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naked brutality, for effectiveness.' 8 ' In large measure, this self-re-
straint would effect much of the clean-up of violence in professional
sports now campaigned for.
Additionally, if the desire to settle such matters "within the fam-
ily" is as strong as indicated, 8 2 then the individual leagues could be
expected to stiffen their own procedures in order to keep cases out of
the criminal courts. This would also further the goal without the neces-
sity of having to press a single charge. Simply by having such a law on
the books, leagues would have to respond by "cleaning house" or face
the prospect of having their contract players marched into court to an-
swer to a higher authority.
This is not to say, however, that cases should not be prosecuted if
the proper opportunity presents itself. Increased regulation of athletic
conduct on the league level will leave little work for the prosecutor
waiting to try a criminal sports violence case. 18 3 Enactment of a Mottl-
type bill followed by the increased league regulation outlined will pro-
vide the significant deterrence required to stem the current violent tide.
Otherwise, prosecutors will get their chance to remove offenders from
181. From the recent literature, it appears clear that eliminating violence from sports
today will reduce the popularity of some sports, notably hockey. See Torts in Sports, supra
note 1, at 769 n.34, where Dr. Walter Menninger, formerly a member of President Lyndon
Johnson's National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, noted that many
individuals "experience a vicarious satisfaction from the open aggression and mayhem on
the ice."
In his House statement introducing H.R. 7903 on July 31, 1980, Rep. Mottl read into
the Congressional Record an article by John Meyer from the Fort Lauderdale News and
Sun-Sentinel of July 20, 1980. The following language was included:
For everything, there is a purpose, including violent behavior in sport. It has
certainly helped to sell football-the NFL denies it, but don't believe it-and in
hockey, there are those who say it helps sell the game to American fans who don't
understand it.
"The large numbers of people who are being exposed to the game now are
often not aware of the skills and finesse that give the game its real appeal." Retired
hockey star Brian Conacher wrote in "Hockey in Canada the Way It Is,". "But
brawling is something they do understand. . . . If there is a little blood, so much
the better for the people with color sets."
126 Cong. Rec. E3712 (daily ed. July 31, 1980). It is this kind of attitude that has invaded
the sports executive's mentality and restricted the effectiveness of intra-league discipline, as
noted earlier.
Those who put any real stock in the inability of American fans to appreciate hockey in
its pure form must have been shocked by the national reaction to the U.S. hockey team that
won the gold medal at the 1980 Winter Olympic Games. Whether American fans under-
stood what they were seeing or not, they certainly appreciated it and tuned in in record
numbers to see more. See SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 3, 1980, at 16-20; SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, Dec. 22-29, 1980, at 30-46.
182. HORROW, supra note 2, at 43-63.
183. See Flakne, supra note 15, at 32.
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the field of play.'84
c. Effect on Level of Play
Many sports professionals have expressed concern that should a
bill such as Mottl's be enacted, the quality of play will be severely af-
fected and would, in fact, decline.1 5  The Ontario Provincial Court
judge in Regina v. Green noted that it is almost impossible for the hock-
ey player involved in a rough fray for the puck in a corner of the rink
to suddenly stop his conduct, in fear of prosecution under a law such as
the Mottl bill.
1 86
If the judge in Green meant that the player would have to consider
stopping legitimate attempts to assist his team's efforts to defend their
goal or help score a point or goal, within the rules and customs of the
game, he can rest easy. The Mottl bill represented no such threat to
professional sports.'87 If the words can be read to imply that where
rough play invites escalation to conduct well outside the rules, where
the intent of the conduct is not to assist the team but to injure the oppo-
184. It is this possibility that will move the leagues toward further regulation and stiff
enforcement of those regulations. The failure of professional sports leagues to restrain vio-
lence is the entire impetus behind the Mottl bill to bring "outsiders" (i.e., the U.S. Attorney)
into the fray. Such "outsiders" are exactly what it appears to take to force the so-far loose
hand of the leagues toward eliminating excessive violence on their fields, courts and rinks. It
seems clear that the athletes themselves do not want any lawyers involved. See HORRoW,
supra note 2, at 43-63 and Hechter, supra note 1, at 438.
Yet Mottl himself introduced a bill that would supposedly reduce sports violence
through arbitration boards established by the professional sports leagues. H.R. 5079, 97th
Congress, 1st Session (1981). The bill sought to add six sections to Title 28 of the United
States Code "to establish an arbitration system for the settlement of grievances resulting
from the use of excessive force during professional sports events, in order to reduce the
number and costs of injuries associated with such events." Id. sec. 2.
The bill would have required that each league set up an arbitration system for sports
violence cases, to be included in the player's collective bargaining agreement. The boards
would be composed of three persons, none of whom are employees of any government. But
the crucial points of how the board members are selected, what disciplinary actions and
compensatory awards are available and what the procedures for filing are, are all left to the
professional sports leagues and their players. Id. sec. 3. Considering the extreme ineffec-
tiveness with which the leagues and their players have policed themselves so far, could this
statutory forum for current league/player policy have been expected to change the level of
sports violence in any significant way? Clearly not: Few will file, those who do will get little
help, and the only satisfactory forum will remain the civil courts, where "outsiders" take a
different view of sports violence than those currently involved. See an. 24, 80-83 & 114-15
supra and accompanying text.
185. The worry is that there would be a rash of trivial suits, marching players in and out
of court as marionettes on the fingers of evil prosecutors. It has been demonstrated that such
fears are utterly unfounded. See notes 146-48 supra and accompanying text.
186. 16 D.L.R.3d 137, 141 (Ont. Provincial Ct. 1970).
187. See Mottl's Statement, supra note 23, at 2.
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nent, and that conduct should be allowed because of the difficulty in
stopping oneself under the circumstances, then there is something
wrong.
Sports is not a protected forum for violence that outside an arena
would clearly be subject to civil or criminal penalties. Whether officials
in various sports leagues or organizations like it or not, this is the
law. '8 It is time for those in sports to recognize this. Those who do
not, such as Forbes, the defendant in the leading American criminal
sports violence case,"8 9 will be forced to realize that should a Mottl-
type bill become law, the Congress will have stated a public policy that
excessive violence in professional sporting events is not to be tolerated.
If the level of play should recede as a result, then so be it. Imagine
what hockey would be like if one could concentrate on team passing,
good stickwork and the elusive ability of outstanding offensive players
to create scoring opportunities?
Some in professional hockey would answer, "boring."' 90 If true,
this boredom would undoubtedly reduce the number of paying custom-
ers, people who are believed to enjoy hockey not for the level of skill
required, but for the violence that usually accompanies even the best-
played games.' 9' From the above, it could be implied that in the
United States, hockey is an unattractive product, requiring on-field vio-
lence to boost its appeal. Perhaps so. But does that justify such con-
duct? Passage of a Mottl-type bill would make the answer a concrete
"no." The National Football League, sensing a lack of excitement in its
games from a dearth of offense, changed the rules to assist offensive
teams. Other sports would do well to follow the same example.'92
188. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 931 (1979).
189. See Forbes' comment at note 143 supra. HORROW cites a comment he received in a
detailed survey of professional athletes: "There is no such thing as a lawsuit; discipline is
handled by league officials, and that's that!" HORROW, supra note 2, at 44. Another survey
response, this time from Log Angeles Kings General Manager George Maguire, stated: "I
am not of the opinion that criminal violence exists in professional sports, and I feel that too
many people try to make a mountain out of a mole hill when they have a tough time even
finding the mole." Id. at 35.
190. Id. at 40-42.
191. Id. Sentiment to leave fighting in hockey games was expressed in an informal sur-
vey of Los Angeles fans published in the Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, Mar. 24,
1981, sec. 3, at 1. But, what of the many Americans who derived enjoyment from the per-
formance of the U.S. team at the Winter Olympics? See note 181 supra.
192. Note the recommendation of Richard L. Binder in Comment, The Consent Defense:
Sports, Violence, and the Criminal Law, 13 AM. CiuM. L. REV. 235 (1975): "A revised rule
structure in hockey which penalizes dangerous practices unnecessary to the game is re-
quired." Id. at 248. Stephen Gulotta, our commentator in Torts in Sports, supra note 1,
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Passage of a Mottl-type bill will undoubtedly change professional
sports as they are now played. Whether those changes add or detract to
the level of play may depend on one's perspective. Those who stand to
gain from revenues believed to be boosted by the presence of the exces-
sively violent conduct that now pervades some sports may well state
that the level of "play" has declined.' 93 Others, concerned with the
propriety of sport itself and what it stands for in society, and especially
as it reflects on emulative behavior by society's youngsters, will posit
that any device to eliminate the needless violence in sports today can
only be a welcome addition, bound to upgrade any game's
standards. 
94
V. CONCLUSION
The problem is excessive violence in professional sporting events
today. Penalties imposed by the rules of each game have been insuffi-
cient to deter violent conduct by players and league disciplinary proce-
dures have been equally ineffective, as players treat such penalties,
usually quite mild, as merely an extension of the playing rules, with an
equally non-deterrent effect. Civil tort cases have made some inroads
in the field, but owing to their long lead time in coming to trial, cannot
be charged with responsibility for providing immediate deterrence to
players. Prior attempts at criminal prosecution in the United States
have failed under current standards relating to assault.
Congress, through enactment of a Mottl-type bill, can grasp a
unique and timely opportunity to equip prosecutors with the tool to
ferret out and discipline excessively violent players through the federal
maintains that the most effective restraint of all might be to impose rule changes that affect
the competitiveness of the team. Id. at 792.
A newspaper article illustrated the effectiveness of such sanctions. The article, discuss-
ing international-class water polo, traditionally a "dirty" sport, noted that recent rule
changes that significantly reduced a team's effectiveness via stiff penalties for prohibited
conduct, have cleaned up the game tremendously:
[American coach Monte] Nitzkowski says the implementation of the foul rule
has eliminated much of the unnecessary roughness of the game. A flagrant foul
may mean a 45-second ejection from the game. A brutality foul will result in a
one- or two-game suspension. Nitzkowski says losing a player for two games of a
tournament such as the FINA Cup can ruin a team's chances.
"Guys on the international level have too much to lose so play has really
cleaned up," Nitzkowski said.
Los Angeles Times, Apr. 24, 1981, sec. 3, at i.
193. See HORROW, supra note 2, at 41, quoting NHL President Clarence Campbell;
Hechter, supra note 1, at 432.
194. See J. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 519-46 (1976); Hechter, supra note 1, at 425-
28, 453; Hallowell, supra note 145, at 28, 32; Mottl's Statement, supra note 23, at 2-3.
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criminal system. The probable reaction of the sports leagues, to tighten
internal disciplinary procedures and avoid the embarrassment of losing
their contract players to the penitentiary, will reduce the need for inter-
vention by prosecutors and keep player discipline essentially "within
the family."
The time has come for a reduction in violence in sports. Those
already in sports have failed. However distasteful it may be to those
individuals, it is now time for outsiders to step in and do the job the
sports professionals have abdicated.
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Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing today and for permitting me to appear
before the Subcommittee. I am confident that under your able leadership, the Subcommit-
tee will examine fairly and fully the serious problem of excessive sports violence.
On July 31, 1980, I introduced in Congress H.R. 7903, the Sports Violence Act of 1980.
To my knowledge, this bill is the first serious attempt in Congress to curb the episodes of
excessive violence that increasingly characterize professional sports.
My bill would make it a federal crime for professional players to use excessive during-
the-game force that creates a significant risk of injury, when that force has no reasonable
relationship to the competitive goals of the sport, is unreasonably violent, and could not be
reasonably foreseen or consented to by the intended victim.
It is difficult at times to draw a clear line between contact that we all agree is part of any
rugged, physical game, and needlessly violent, vicious and dangerous contact that has no
place on or off the field.
But for the good of sports, players and fans, it is time we blew the whistle on conduct
that would be prosecuted if it happened on the street but which has too often been over-
looked in the arena.
Let me be specific about the kinds of conduct my bill is intended to penalize.
It is directed to the player who smashes a hockey stick over the head of an opponent.
This is not sport.
It is directed to the baseball player who drops his bat or glove and raises his fists. This
is not sport.
It is directed to the basketball player who crushes the face of another with his fist. This
is not sport.
It is directed to the lineman who deliberately slams into and injures the opposing
quarterback long after the play is dead. This is not sport.
When we are looking at these extreme kinds of actions, I have no doubt whatsoever that
a carefully drawn federal statute can preserve the health and vitality of professional sports,
while serving notice on pro athletes that they have no license to commit televised assault and
battery.
A statute marking out the line between normal and accepted aggressive behavior in
sports, and excessively violent and repugnant conduct, would yield a number of important
benefits.
First, the threat of criminal prosecution would deter the most extreme acts and make
each game safer for all participants.
Second, a player who stays on the safe side of the line need never worry about
prosecution.
Third, legislation will symbolically confirm that fundamental law and order do not stop
at the ticket gate.
Finally, and in my book most importantly, I believe that incidents of excessive during-
the-game violence must be punished when countless young people look to professional
sports figures as role models for their own behavior on and off the field.
Recently in my own city of Cleveland, a pro basketball player in a local summer league
became angered and reportedly struck a young referee in the face. The injury later required
an eye operation, but that wasn't the major concern of this young referee who himself was a
college athlete.
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The referee later said, "What hurts me the most is that the young kids in the stands will
think, 'Hey, he did it. I can do it too'."
Yes, I've received my share of mail calling sports violence a phony issue, describing my
bill as the latest example of needless Big Government meddling, and asking why I haven't
single-handedly solved inflation if I have so much time on my hands.
I send my correspondents some comments on this issue from figures who have attained
more prominence in the sports world than I achieved as a Notre Dame pitcher and one-
season minor leaguer.
Joseph Robbie, an owner of the Miami Dolphins, has stated: "I perceive that one of the
greatest threats to the future of professional sports of every kind, here and abroad, is may-
hem on the field and crowd violence. We need to take stern and strict measures for ade-
quate control in each instance. Football and hockey are games of controlled violence, and
any deliberate act which would constitute criminal assault should be handled in the same
manner as any similar act off the field."
Veteran sports commentator and analyst Howard Cosell has commented: "In my opin-
ion, excessive violence in professional sports is a serious problem that hasn't gotten enough
attention from those in a position to do something about it. The operation of law should not
stop at the ticket gate of any sporting event. If league officials and local prosecutors won't
act to clean up professional sports, they may be leaving Congress ao choice but to fill the
void."
In drafting this bill, I have had the invaluable assistance of Richard B. Horrow, a legal
expert and author on sports violence. The Sporting News editorialized recently that the
product of our work "is not a random swing at violence, but a thoroughly analyzed and
researched proposal."
The attorney for Darryl Stingley, a former New England Patriot football player who is
paralyzed from a playing field collision, is 0. Jackson Sands of Boston. Sands has stated:
"It appears that the United States Congress is the only forum available to those of us who
are gravely concerned about the increased violence in professional sports. It is apparent that
the leagues themselves are unwilling to take the necessary corrective measures. Further-
more, it seems unmanageable for the various state courts to intervene as we could have fifty
different rules of conduct in professional sports."
Mr. Chairman, I believe that pro organizations have not dealt swiftly and effectively
with excessive violence in their sports, even though they prefer to keep this matter within the
family. Yet the performance of our fine olympic hockey team against the Soviets this year
gave lie to the notion that you can't play good, tough, crowd-pleasing hockey without
fistfights every five minutes. What do we see in nearly every National Hockey League
game? A barroom brawl on skates.
Local prosecution for assault and battery, while attempted increasingly by concerned
local officials, has been inconsistent and ineffective.
Congress, therefore, may indeed be the only forum available for the protection of the
public interest as a whole.
This is not a new issue for Congressional interest. I was a member of the Select Com-
mittee on Sports in the 94th Congress. The more we looked into professional sports vio-
lence, the more concerned we became. We concluded in our final report that "escalating
sports violenze will force local prosecutors to seek criminal sanctions to contain the level of
violence in the public interest." And we found that "the professional sports industry as a
whole could reduce or eliminate violence in a very short time by making it perfectly clear
that such acts will not be tolerated."
If we had seen appreciable improvement since this 1977 report, I would not be sitting
here today. But I have become convinced that to curb this problem while preserving the
sports themselves, a national standard for unacceptable during-the-game conduct is
necessary.
A week ago Sunday, Washington quarterback Joe Theismann went through a bruising
game aginst Oakland. He came out complaining of late hits and cheap shots, including one
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episode in which he was literally picked up and slammed down on his shoulder by a lineman
who drew an unnecessary roughness penalty.
Theismann's comments to the Washington Post say it all:
"This has no place in the game of football, and it should be dealt with accordingly. It
still goes on and you don't see any real major punishments, or fines, or suspensions. What
are they waiting for? Somebody to get killed, and then they're going to do something?
There's got to be a deterrent in some way, shape or form. And until they put a heavy
enough deterrent on it, it's going to happen."
Yet, what is the NFL now fining players for? Baggy socks! Even more ironic, the
rationale for socking it to several Cincinnati Bengals is that such sloppiness harms pro foot-
ball's public image, and that young people emulate what they see on television!
So, Mr. Chairman, for the league officials, who chose not to be here, I'll repeat Joe
Theismann's question: What are you waiting for?
Thank you.
